Trauma y el narcisismo negativo en los casos límite by Portela de Carvalho, Márcia Teresa & de Camargo Viana, Terezinha
| Psychol. av. disciP. | Bogotá, colomBia | vol. 7 | N.° 2 | P. 101-114 |  Julio - diciEmBrE | 2013 | issN 1900-2386 |
artículos de revisiÓN
* As ideias desenvolvidas neste artigo são provenientes de tese de doutorado defendida no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura da 
Universidade de Brasília (2011), financiada pela Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES).
** Pesquisadora Colaboradora (Programa de Pós Graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura, Departamento de Psicologia Clínica – UnB). Doutora em Psicologia 
(Programa de Pós Graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura, Departamento de Psicologia Clínica – UnB). Psicóloga Clínica. cptmarcia@brturbo.com.br
*** Professor Associado do Instituto de Psicologia da Universidade de Brasília. Bolsista CNPq. Coordenadora do Curso de Especialização em Teoria Psica-
nalítica (Programa de Pós Graduação em Psicologia Clínica e Cultura, PCl – UnB). tcviana@unb.org
trauma aNd the Negative Narcissism iN 
BorderliNe cases*
trauma y el Narcisismo Negativo eN los casos límite
máRCia teResa PoRtela de CaRvalho** & teReziNha de CamaRgo viaNa***
UNiveRsidade de BRasília, BRasília – BRazil
Fecha de recepcióN: 8/7/2013 • Fecha de aceptacióN: 13/9/2013
Para citar este artículo: Carvalho, M. & Viana, T. (2013). Trauma and the negative narcissism in borderline cases.
Psychologia: avances de la disciplina, 7 (2), 101-114.
Abstract
This work emphasizes the deadly repetition as a psychic violence revealed by the issue of trauma. This theme is particularly important for the 
clinic of borderline cases. The Freudian idea that combines trauma and sexuality has existed since the beginnings of psychoanalysis. But are 
there different focuses along its work? How they can be related to borderline cases clinic? We are guided by the Freudian text called Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920) and by Andre Green´s propositions on the subject, which concern: The Neutral, objectifying and deobjectfying 
functions and negative narcissism. From the moment Freud complexifies the notion of trauma so it evidences an excess of external stimuli and 
instinctual that cannot be part of the chain of psychic representation, Freud also reveals a particular mode of objectual-love: the pair sadism-
masochism. But while this pair is still expression of Eros, Green’s Neutral concept is the expression of what he calls negative narcissism. In 
both cases, the traumatic is a requirement of presentification.
Keywords: borderline, trauma, negative narcissism.
Resumen
Este trabajo hace énfasis en la repetición de cómo la violencia psíquica revela el trauma. Este tema es particularmente importante para la 
clínica de los casos límite. La idea freudiana de que combina el trauma y la sexualidad ha existido desde los comienzos del psicoanálisis. Pero 
¿existen diferentes enfoques a lo largo de su trabajo? ¿Cómo pueden estar relacionados con la clínica de los casos límite? Nos guiamos por el 
texto freudiano llamado Más allá del principio del placer (1920) y por las proposiciones de Andre Green en el tema, que se refieren a la objetiva-
ción y deobjetivación, funciones neutrales y narcisismo negativo. Desde el momento en que Freud complejiza la noción de trauma por lo que 
evidencia un exceso de estímulos externos e instintivos que no pueden ser parte de la cadena de la representación psíquica, Freud también 
revela un modo particular de amor objetual: el par sadismo-masoquismo. Pero mientras este par sigue siendo expresión de Eros, el concepto 
Neutral de Green es la expresión de lo que él llama narcisismo negativo. En ambos casos, el trauma es un requisito.
Palabras clave. Límite, trauma, narcisismo negativo.
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Introduction
Setting the opening of a conference named Con-
ceptualizations and Limits on August 25th, 1986; André 
Green (1990) stated that the breakthrough in Psychoa-
nalysis was Freud. As Freud being a novelty in Psychoa-
nalysis is a hardly original statement, we would com-
plete: Freud beyond his understanding on the pleasure 
principle. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/2006), 
Freud invites us to go one step further, in fact, one step 
beyond the understanding of psyche, questioning the 
sovereignty of the pleasure principle. According to Gay 
(1988), Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/2006), 
Group Psychology and analysis of the Ego (1921/1996), and 
The Ego and the Id (1923/2007) show the structural sys-
tem of the psychic apparatus that Freud supports for 
the rest of his life.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/2006), Freud 
is interested in discuss over certain phenomena that do 
not fit in the pleasure principle dynamics. What is be-
yond would be more archaic, more instinctual and would 
act independently from the pleasure principle. Such 
principle is considered a metapsychological construct 
that briefly describes how the psychic apparatus works 
to reduce the tension accumulated by the excess of ex-
citations.
Costa (2003) states that Beyond the Pleasure Princi-
ple has as main objective to reorder the former division 
of death and life drives, leading attention to the facet 
of psychic life that tends to the destruction of subject 
and object. «Now, besides sexuality, the destruction will 
participate decisively in the explanation of mental me-
chanisms» (Costa, 2003, p. 29). This text, along with 
Thoughts for the times on war and death (1915/1996), Civi-
lization and its discontents ([1930(1929)]/1996), and Why 
War? (1932/1996) deals with the violence that structu-
rally plagues us.
Similarly, Cardoso (2010) states that the repe-
tition compulsion, tone of the work Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, «arises to try to explain the problem of violence 
in human subjectivity (at the individual level and also in 
culture)» (Cardoso, 2010, p. 56). That violence would 
be a hallmark of pathologies which are beyond the neu-
rosis: the ones described in psychoanalytic literature as 
the borderline cases.
To Pontalis (1991), Beyond the pleasure principle an-
nounces a repetition of the same, where enjoyment and 
pain operate together. The repetition highlights the di-
mension of the act (reaction rather than action), which 
expresses a violent, traumatic force. Green (1988a) sta-
tes that the true meaning of this text goes beyond the 
question of enjoyment and pain. The actual point is to 
show that the model that governs the psychic activity 
is a negative hallucinatory accomplishment of desire. 
And in this sense «displeasure is not the substitute of 
pleasure, but the Neutral is» (Green, 1988a, p.24). The 
desire finds «its accomplishment in the reproduction 
of hallucinatory perceptions that have become signs 
of satisfaction» (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1970, p.159) 
which shows the rudimentary presence of the psyche 
(Celes, 2004). In its turn, the negative hallucinatory 
accomplishment of desire is expressed by the non-desi-
re. Green (1988b) tells us that the Neutral challenges 
the traditional line of thought as it speaks of «an anorexia 
of living» and a psychic death.
It’s possible to observe that Beyond the pleasure 
principle (1920/2006) stands as a support to many in-
terpretations, because it brings a redefinition of what is 
even considered to be psychic, or yet, what psychic is 
about. These interpreters of Freud’s work have in com-
mon the idea that in his so-called theoretical turn», 
Freud rediscovers the importance of repetition in the 
basic constitution of psychic functioning. Moreover, 
this repetition is related to the repetition compulsion 
and to the death drive, its basic and constitutional vicis-
situdes. The deadly repetition appears in Freud’s thin-
king at the heart of a fundamental drive conflict which 
brings into play the most primitive forms of psychic ac-
tivity, something beyond the relation between pleasure-
displeasure.
According to the exposed, it will be shown in this 
paper the problem of repetition as a psychic violence re-
vealed by the issue of trauma. This issue, by its instance, 
is related to the presence of an excess of external and 
also internal drive stimuli, which cannot take part in the 
chain of representations, neither in the apparatus of ps-
ychic bearing, and then reappears in the form of a repe-
tition compulsion. This issue gains importance when we 
draw attention for what in today’s psychoanalytic clinic 
has been named as casos-limite or borderline cases. There 
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is a consensus among the statement of Garcia (2005) that 
«the contingencies of subjectification present nowadays 
have a traumatic effect on the subjective constitution» 
(Garcia, 2005, p.143, emphasis added).
As one redeems the various meanings of trauma 
in Freud’s work, it is clear that the idea of trauma is 
constitutive of psychic birth. In the same way, thinking 
about the relationship between current subjectivity and 
trauma is thinking about the quality of trauma expe-
rienced by the subjects nowadays: factors, external and 
internal to the subject, that «hinder the possibility of 
assimilation and psychic elaboration (and) precipitates, 
on the other hand, a disinterested reaction» (García, 
2005, p. 145). The Freudian idea that combines trauma 
and sexuality has existed since the beginnings of psy-
choanalysis. But what are the differences in this idea 
throughout Freud’s work? How to relate his work to 
the clinic of borderline cases? André Green’s proposi-
tions regarding the effects of traumatic conditions over the 
psychic constitution in our days will also be considered.
This work is guided by the Freudian text called 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920/2006), one of the 
texts that consolidate the «theoretical turn» of 1920 
and where the explanation of the new theory of dri-
ves lies. In this new turn, the ideas of psychic violen-
ce and trauma, now seen through the excess of drive 
and through the limits of representation, return in the 
theory and allow an opening to the understanding of 
other clinical configurations besides the neurosis. Car-
doso (2010) believes that this return brings a more ra-
dical dimension, where the phenomenon of repetition 
compulsion appears linked to the need for punishment by 
the strand of masochism. But this radicalism is also related 
to the concepts of deobjectfyng function and negative 
narcissism proposed by Green (1988b).
We start with the assumption that there are, in 
Freud’s work, complex attempts to understand the psy-
chic organizations and those enable us to dialogue with 
and to think of the clinic of borderline cases of our 
times. We understand that Freud’s work has built the 
scope that is enabling psychoanalysts to support and 
include this clinic in their practice. Moreover, we con-
sider greatly relevant the contribution of André Green, 
in referral to his understanding and reinterpretation of 
Freud’s legacy on the theme.
On the clinic of borderline cases: 
contextualization
There are numerous publications that discuss the 
existence of a subject threatened in its narcissistic inte-
grity and about the traumatic experience. The compul-
sive processes, which are often expressed as addictions, 
appear as the subject seeks manners to protect himself 
against short-termism. What is ephemeral stands out and 
brings with it the promise of satisfying desires always in-
satiable by definition. It is a mode of operation focused 
on the purchase and acquisition rather than in produc-
tivity. The subject ingests compulsively and excessively 
–products, images and information– but do not know 
how to digest them (Bauman, 2001; Birman, 2006; Bau-
drillard, 2008; Debord, 2009).
Garcia (2005) says that the discomfort of today 
differs from that presented by Freud in 1930. While the 
Freudian was marked by guilt, conflict, and by the im-
portance of repression; our times present subjects sub-
merged into the sense of emptiness and indifference, or 
dominated by feelings of failure and by the requirement 
of autonomy. The discussion of the author reaches the 
category of Freudian trauma and also the concepts of de-
objectfying function and negative narcissism from André 
Green.
Especially sensitive to trauma, the subject of our 
times makes a drive disinvestment in the form of a ne-
gative narcissism as a defensive reaction to the current 
conditions of subjectivity ie, a defensive reaction against 
the excess of stimulation and the urgent demands. Each 
subject must deal with a complexity for which he does 
not own equally complex apparatus of psychic symboli-
zation. This inadequacy has a direct impact on the ability 
for action and representation.
Figueiredo (2003) asserts that modernity has led 
us to think about trauma and dissociation as figures able 
to directly affect the subjectivity processes in contempo-
rary world. The senses, always transient, and the repea-
ted attempts of classification and organization have made 
necessary (evident) the ambiguity and the traumatic ex-
perience. The subject, moved temporarily to a condition 
of chaos, experiences himself on a state of non-defensive 
exposition at the presence of an object that places him in 
a passive, infantile position.
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Therefore, in addition to repression, the splitting 
also became way to highlight the unbearable in human 
experience. The unbearable, understood in this work as 
the experience of the dissolution or, if we go a step fur-
ther, as an experience of death which, in its life presenta-
tion, indicates a temporary lack of limits and boundaries. 
If the idea of repression refers to the idea of  castration 
anxiety and to the evidence of a lack, the splitting refers 
to an experience of a drive excess by means of presence 
and absence. Presence and absence of the primary object 
and also presence of an excess of drive and absence of a 
psychic apparatus capable to order the excess in trails.
And the clinic, as a privileged instrument to ob-
serve the psychic illnesses, has presented the challenge 
of dealing with nuclei far regressed on subjects appa-
rently neurotic. What current literature call borderline 
cases have required psychoanalysts to revisit the trauma-
tic events, going further on the understanding and dee-
pening on the main premises of the drive theories; to 
make a clinic that is engaged to the understanding of the 
psychic birth and what would be able to (re)found this 
psychic.
Related to issues of trauma and repetition, we 
have found that are prior and below the constitution of 
the psychic conflict. We are dealing with restated ways 
of understanding the origins of mental life. Desire and 
trauma, by the paths of rebuilt memory and repetition 
in the act, both present the archaic in psychoanalysis and 
date back to the origin of the psyche. (Carvalho, 2011; 
Celes, 2004; Chabert, 2008; Figueiredo 2003; Figueire-
do, 2009; Green, 2001; Green, 2008).
The clinic of borderline cases indicates the pro-
blems of mental constitutions of both internal and ex-
ternal borders. If the internal borders require an un-
derstanding of the psychic apparatus beyond the division 
unconscious/conscious (first topic), the external borders 
require a focus on the constitution of the psychic appa-
ratus (second topic).
The need, in borderline cases, of an increased fo-
cus on formation of the psychic apparatus rather than 
on the issues of desire, points to the very process of for-
mation of thought. The thought inquires itself through 
someone who asks the question and enables its own 
constitution. Unlike the desire that, in principle, can-
not be accomplished, the formation of mental apparatus 
through the presence of the other must be achieved. One 
can say that questioning and specially answering beco-
mes the subject, as it provides him with contours and 
territoriality. This is something that is engendered in a 
constant attempt to completion: to think, as to desire, is 
constantly becoming.
Beyond the pleasure principle: On «beyond»
In a letter to Ferenczi dated March 19, 1919, 
Freud claims to have finished an article with an enigma-
tic title: Beyond the pleasure principle. As stated by Fi-
gueiredo (1999, p.52): «perfectly enigmatic and carrying 
metaphysical resonances, not to say esoteric ones-» be-
yond «... how far and mysterious are we launched to ?». 
And completes in the same paragraph: «It’s like he was 
not the author of this title that sounds uneasily strange 
to him». Something in that title is not recognized as his 
own words». The enigma that lies on the title confirms 
that the psychic origin is formed into a duality of for-
ces that integrate and separate in relations of opposition, 
complementarity, and also of difference. What seems to 
be beyond the pleasure principle is learnt through the 
experience itself, rather than in words, and bothers the 
author as something strange.
Monzani (1989) poses a question: «Is there a text 
more confused, more disorienting, more embarrassing, 
and fuller of pitfalls and contradictions than Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle?» (p.144). In his turn, Gay (1988) sta-
ted that this is a difficult text: «the prose is clear as ever, 
although the high concentration of new ideas in such few 
lines offers disturbing obstacles to an easy comprehen-
sion by the reader» (p. 166).
In fact, it is not an easy reading text. To begin 
with, many are the inquiries to the status of that step be-
yond. Among the questioners, Caropreso and Simanke 
(2006) refer readers to the work of Freud called Project 
for a Scientific Psychology (1905 [1895]) in order to de-
monstrate that the metapsychology found in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920/2007) was already nuanced in the 
manuscript from 1895. The authors believe that Freud 
went a step further by returning to the origins of his own 
metapsychology, resuming some notions that were left in 
the background while passing from the ideas contained 
in the Project... (1905 [1895]) to the conception develo-
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ped in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900 [1901]). Freud 
replaces the pain from the neurotic trauma for the issue 
of repressed desire generating significant changes.
According to the authors, «the theory of sexuality, 
of which the concept of drive is the most significant me-
tapsychological expression, and the theory of narcissism, 
that makes undelayable the elaboration of the concept 
of Ego and precipitates the review of the first topic dri-
ve duality» (Caropreso & Simanke, 2006, p. 16) return 
to the forefront of metapsychological reflection in the 
aftermath of the most important developments of the 
period between 1900 and 1920. All this process will cul-
minate in 1920, in which context reappears the notion of 
repetition compulsion
Thus, one cannot say that the ideas contained in 
Freud’s text of 1920 are entirely new. Considering the 
Freudian style, we can say that old ideas were receiving 
new interpretative statutes, reconfigurations. Freud, in 
a given moment of his text, says that «we have to ad-
mit that there is a strong tendency in the psyche towards 
the pleasure principle, but there are some other forces 
or circumstances that oppose to this trend» (Freud, 
1920/2006, p.137).
In Freud, the reduction of tension is sometimes 
seen as a tendency to keep the amount of stimulation 
constant or as low as possible, and some other times it 
is described as a tendency to rid the psychic apparatus 
of any tension. According to Monzani (1989) there is a 
paradox in this theoretical construct, because at times it 
seems to be at the service of life, a guardian of life, and at 
times it seems to be in the service of death, of decathexis, 
of the outflow of the internal tensions and excitations.
Freud (1920/2006) believes that the principle of 
pleasure –pleasure and displeasure– operates in accor-
dance with the principle of reality, the last is considered 
to be a modification of the first. And so that the psychic 
functioning operates satisfactorily, it is necessary to 
separate the drives whose goals are intolerable for the 
formation of the Ego integration through the process of 
repression. The repressed impulses, in turn, will con-
tinue in their pursuit of satisfaction through substitute 
pathways and will be usually experienced as unpleasant. 
For Freud, all neurotic displeasure is a pleasure that 
cannot be felt as such. So far, there is nothing to be 
considered beyond.
There are several examples mentioned by Freud 
in attempts to demonstrate the existence of other forces 
beyond those which account to the pleasure principle: 
the dreams that lead people back to a traumatic situa-
tion of which one cannot say that they are memories of 
realizations of repressed desires; the famous game fort-
da, where his grandson tirelessly repeated the act of di-
sappearing and reappearing with a wooden spool rolled 
with a string, action interpreted by Freud as an attempt 
of the child to turn the passive experience of the pain-
ful disappearance of a parent in an empowerment active 
of this original experience, enabling the reassurance of 
the psychic experience of disappearance and return; the 
transference relationship, which allows repetitive expres-
sion of the repressed infantile material as if it were a pre-
sent experience; and the simultaneous support, during 
the management of transference, of the resistances from 
the egoic organization which try to prevent the unplea-
sant release of repressed content.
However, it does not seem so simple to explain 
the existence of forces that act beyond the pleasure prin-
ciple. Note that the activity is the main topic, but at each 
new step taken by Freud in an attempt to show his thesis, 
the more he steps back and says that the phenomenon 
described may also be related to the pleasure principle. 
He was once more in the exercise of his arduous task of 
describing an idea that is not in the field of description, 
but in the field of apprehension, characteristic of all me-
tapsychology.
Freud (1920/2006) notes that the repetitive action of 
the drives, coercion (compulsion) that forces a repetition, 
an «eternal return of the same,» is found in the life of 
neurotic and non-neurotic subjects. There would be in the 
psychic life a compulsion to repetition, and it does not always 
seem to be subordinated to the pleasure principle. The 
difference is in the way a person experiences the repea-
ted experience: if in an active or in a passive mode.
The «eternal return of the same» is not surprising 
when it follows an active attitude. But the repetitive expe-
rience in the passive mode obeys the repetition compul-
sion without being related to the pleasure principle and it 
happens in what Freud called destination neurosis. Until 
that theoretical moment, the repetition compulsion was 
present in Freud’s work through the obsessive neurosis, 
which repetitions are associated to the interdictions to 
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the repressed desires. From 1920, and particularly in 
1924 with the development of the Idea of masochism, 
the repetition compulsion binds to a need for punish-
ment.
In an attempt to take a step further in his work, 
He refers to excitations from outside which, when excessive, are 
able to break through the protective shield responsible 
for cushion excitations and then penetrate into the dee-
per layers of psyche. In these circumstances, the pleasure 
principle is put out of action and the excess of excite-
ment is experienced as traumatic.
As described, «the shield makes that the energies 
of the outside world can only get forward to the next 
layer, located just below –and who remained alive– in 
a small fraction of its intensity» (Freud, 1920/2006, 
p.151). Since, in humans, the sensory organs are respon-
sible for protecting the body against excessive amounts of 
external stimuli, it can be stated that the excess of external 
information may be able to distort or even block the sensory, 
perceptual and motor functions of the subjects. What would 
be beyond?
The return to the idea of trauma and one 
step beyond
Laplanche and Pontalis (1970) claim about 
the existence of different moments in the understan-
ding of the trauma concept in the course of Freud’s 
work. In a letter to Josef Breuer of 06.29.1892 and 
published in Sketches for the ‘Preliminary Communication’ 
(1893a[(1940-41 [1892]])/1996], Freud says that the 
element always present in a hysterical attack is the re-
turn of a traumatic memory and provides a definition 
of psychic trauma, «turns to psychic trauma impression 
that the entire nervous system has difficulty in abolis-
hing through associative thinking or motor reaction» 
(Freud, [1893 (1940-41 [1892])] / 1996, p.196).
In the article entitled «On the psychical mechanism 
of hysterical phenomena» (1893b/1996), Freud declares 
publicly that «there is a total analogy between traumatic pa-
ralysis and common hysteria, non-traumatic)» (p.40, empha-
sis added) and that both are determined by remarkable 
affective experiences (a violent affect). He says then, 
that every hysteria can be seen as traumatic hysteria and 
that any trauma implies an underlying psychic trauma. 
If a traumatic affection does not bind to any represen-
tation, remains a psychic trauma.
Freud presents the etiological influences of neu-
rosis in his article entitled Heredity and the etiology of 
neuroses (1896a/1996), in which he establishes a close 
relationship between the onset of a neurosis and sexual 
trauma, because he recognizes the existence of sexual 
influences in all cases of neurosis. In hysterical and ob-
sessive neurosis, the unconscious memory related to 
sexual life has two important characteristics: it is «an 
early experience of sexual relations with real excitement of geni-
tals, resulting from a sexual abuse committed by another per-
son, and this event occurs in the period of childhood» (Freud, 
1896a/1996, p. 151, emphasis added).
Freud speaks of «a brutal assault committed by 
an adult» and speaks of «seduction» as forms of abuse. 
At this point, Freud believed that trauma occurs at first, 
but due to the precocity of the event, it is preserved as 
psychic trace and reappears at puberty. «What happens 
is the action of a posthumous sexual trauma» (Freud, 
1896a/1996, p.152). The pathogenic factor is not the 
trauma itself, but its memory.
In his study of The Etiology of hysteria (1896b/1996), 
Freud abandons his belief in the veracity of the situa-
tions experienced by children in their earliest childho-
od and later remembered by the adult in analysis. As 
explained in his letter 69 to Fliess (1897), it was im-
possible that all parents had committed actual sexual 
abuse of their children. Freud takes then a new path, 
the path of fantasy. It is the child who fantasies the sce-
nes of seduction. This inversion changes considerably 
the meaning of trauma, as it allows thinking of trauma 
and psychic directions, paving the way for the concept 
of psychic reality.
Only in 1920, on Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
Freud complexifies and retakes the idea of trauma that 
comes from an external event and from the drives that 
are yet in a free state, typical of the primary process. 
The dreams of those who have traumatic neurosis are 
not in the service of fulfillment of desires: «It is then 
assumed that such dreams might lend themselves to 
another task that must precede the start of the sovereig-
nty of the pleasure principle» (Freud, 1920/2006, p. 
156, emphasis added). If in the development of his first 
trauma theory Freud binds trauma, desire and fantasy, 
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now he develops a second theory in which he is able to 
reinclude the dimension of pain in traumatic events.
Freud (1920/2006) is interested in distinguis-
hing a physical trauma from a psychic trauma. In the 
former case, there is a real object (the body) and a nar-
cissistic cathexis that directs the excess of sexual libido 
released at the time of the shock, in the second case, 
the fright derived from the shock releases an excess of 
sexual libido (unbound infantile experiences) which, in 
the absence of the object, remains free and without the 
possibility of runoff. More than the accident itself, trau-
matic is the excess of free unlinked energy.
The repetition compulsion indicates, thereby, the 
work of the psychic apparatus to process [bewältingen] 
or bind [binden], in the level of the primary process, 
impulses derived from an excess of excitations from 
outside or from the drives, which operate with free 
and mobile energy. The drives are «the representatives 
of all actions of the forces that arise within the body 
and are transmitted to the psychic apparatus» (Freud, 
1920/2006, p.158). But a drive cannot be observed di-
rectly. It is the repetition compulsion as an act that allows 
the revelation of the drive.
We can observe that both the excess of exter-
nal impulses that invade the psychic apparatus and the 
impulses from the internal drives can cause traumatic 
disruption if not properly processed or, in Freudian 
terms, bound. The manifestation of the repetition 
compulsion also displays thus «a highly instinctual na-
ture» (Freud, 1920/2006, p.159). And the trauma may 
be triggered by factors both external and internal to 
the organism.
Another conception of trauma appears in the 
Freudian text called Inhibitions, symptoms and anxiety 
(1926 [1925]). In this text Freud associates the issue 
of trauma to the child’s mental helplessness, triggered by 
the separation from the mother: «For the child, as a 
result of lack of understanding the facts, the situation 
of missing his mother is not a dangerous situation, but 
a traumatic situation» (Freud, 1926 [1925]/1996, p. 
165). Note that the trauma is not triggered by the se-
paration from the mother per se, but as a result of the 
incomprehension, by the child, of this separation.
By stating that the separation from an object 
must be painful, Freud questions if the separation of an 
object produces anxiety, grief or just pain. For Freud, 
the pain experienced in the mental sphere is a real reac-
tion to the loss of the object, while anxiety is a reac-
tion to the danger which that loss entails. The transi-
tion from physical pain to mental pain corresponds to 
a change from narcissistic cathexis to object cathexis. 
«An object representation that is highly cathected by 
the drive need plays the same role as a body part ca-
thected by an increased stimulus. The continuous na-
ture of the process cathectic and the inability to stop it 
produce the same mental state of helplessness» (Freud, 
1926 [1925], p.166).
The narcissistic cathexis is thus physical and re-
quires a libidinal investment in the body itself. In turn, 
the object-cathexis is mental and involves libidinal in-
vestment in an object representation. And both proces-
ses can be traumatic. However, if we think that this is a 
text from 1926, when there was already the idea of the 
Ego libidinally invested as an object, we can think that 
this transition pointed out by Freud not only brought a 
change from narcissistic cathexis to object cathexis, as 
it brought the possibility of thinking about a narcissistic 
object cathexis and a cathexis of the narcissistic object.
In the first case, it is assumed that the part of 
the body that is cathected by increased stimulus can be 
anyone that is invested libidinally. And in the second 
case, it is assumed that the representation of object ca-
thected by drive need is the Ego itself, the egoic body. 
We can think that the experience of body fragmentation 
is as traumatic as the experience of an imprisonment 
in one´s own psychic body. Here we can see nuanced 
some of the descriptions found when studying the bor-
derline cases. We can also think that the two possibili-
ties show experiences of helplessness and experiences 
of analysis.
Returning to Freud’s work of 1920, it was men-
tioned a transition from physical trauma to psychic 
trauma, and, considering the notion of psychic trauma, 
it can either be originated from an excess of excita-
tions from outside, by breaking the protection shield, 
or from within, both producing a state of «mental hel-
plessness». In this cases, the task of the psychic appa-
ratus to process [bewältigen] or bind [bindem] the ex-
citement would have priority, not in opposition to the 
pleasure principle, but operating independently of him 
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and, in part, without taking it into account (Freud , 
1920/2006, p.158).
Thereby, we can think that beyond the pleasure 
principle are the unlinked drive forces, that have a traumatic 
effect, and whose quality is the helplessness, and that are 
below the Bindung.
The drive, the traumatic and the 
repetition compulsion
Freud wonders on the nature of the relation 
between the drives and the compulsion to repeat. Un-
til then, we had in mind that the drive is a force that 
leads to the change and the new; but Freud radicalizes 
and tells us that all the organic drives aim at restoring 
a previous state. The organic drives are conservative 
and compel to repetition, seeking a steady return of 
the same. The repetition speaks, thus, about the drive 
work itself. He then adds that «organic evolution is due 
to the action of disturbing and deviant external forces» 
(Freud, 1920/2006, p. 161).
The same route would be constantly repeated 
if there was not the action of external forces. Life is 
aroused from inanimate matter, but requires external 
elements to its birth and continuity. It is by this thin-
king that Freud comes to the expression: «The inani-
mate existed before the living» (Freud, 1920/2006, p.161, 
emphasis added). But Freud has difficulty showing how 
the life drive (Eros) may be conservative, considering 
that is always seeking to go beyond itself. Similarly, he 
found the difficulty to prove, in the case of sexual drive, 
«the existence of a character typical of the repetition 
compulsion [Wiederholungszwang]» (Freud, 1920/2006, 
p.176).
There is a drive type that works towards the re-
turn to the inanimate state and is called by Freud of 
Ego-Drives, which drive toward death. Similarly, there 
are the life drives (Eros) or sexual drives, which works 
to preserve the «correct way to die», they shall provide 
for the maintenance of life and they long for a state 
never before achieved. These drives work to postpone 
death, as they length the chains that sustain life. The life 
drive (Eros) could not only unite split off parts, as the 
only possibility to make it whole again is throwing itself 
on a work of blending differences together by making 
germinate something new, not yet known. The death 
drive instead works on keeping the peace at the expense 
of the destruction of any alterity.
There would be a compromise between these 
two forces. The work of Eros acts in pursuit of a move 
beyond, consequently producing the death of the same/
old. But at the same time it works in the service of 
order maintenance, a process that needs to be repea-
ted: life itself. Life drives (Eros) throw themselves to 
death to reach their self-preservation. The death drive 
destroys anything in the order of preservation of life, 
seeking to exclude any stimulus that is external to its 
inertia.
With this argument, we have attained the new 
Freudian reorganization of life and death drives. Freud 
groups the Ego drive and the sex drive as life drives 
(Eros). The Ego leaves from the condition of a purely 
repressing instance and is now also considered to be 
the true and original reservoir of libido. To reach the 
object, it would have to leave this reservoir. «Therefore, 
the Ego became part of our list of sexual objects, and 
we soon realized it was the most important of these ob-
jects. We then proceeded to call narcissistic the entire 
libido which is housed in the Ego» (Freud, 1920/2006, 
p. 173). The ego starts to be considered both a reser-
voir of libido and an object of libido. And the guiding 
principle from that libido is the objectual love.
The opposition life and death reaches the dimen-
sions of the object and of love. He highlights a particu-
lar mode of objectual love, the pair sadism-masochism, 
as an expression of the death drive. This is a possessive 
love that must be overcome and destroyed. Perhaps this is 
the ultimate expression of the erotic drive in its narcis-
sistic and negative bias. This is because the object is no 
longer an object of love, but an object of possession, 
disqualified and dehumanized.
Sadism is capable of trying to destroy the alterity 
or any stimulation from the outside world. Masochism, 
in turn, could try to make the Ego destroy itself, as it 
would be understood as the return of the hate toward 
itself in order to merge with the other. In both cases 
there is an attempt to destroy alterity. It is worth su-
pporting this argumentation about sadism and maso-
chism in metapsychological dimension, so that we can 
understand this reasoning as an attempt to comprehend 
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not only the clinical phenomena that show the power 
of love and hate in such perverse mode, but also the 
functioning of life and death drives.
From this pulsional duality (1920) and also from 
the Freudian ideas about the defusion of the drives in 
severe neuroses (1923), Green (1988a) brings the idea 
that Freud lacked to develop a relationship between 
narcissism and death drive, which he proposed to call 
negative narcissism. Green proposes the idea that the 
essential goal of life drives (Eros) is to guarantee an ob-
jectifying function. In contrast, the essential goal of the 
death drives is to ensure a deobjectifying function through 
unbinding.
Green also proposes the hypothesis that the es-
sential goal of life drives (Eros) is to ensure an objecti-
fying function, whose main effect is to perform symbo-
lization. The idea of such a function is to extend the 
objectalizing processes to the various modes of mental 
activity, so that «in the limit, it is the investment itself that 
is objectifyed» (Green, 1988b, p.65). Likewise, the goal 
of the death drive is to perform a deobjectifying function 
through what he calls the disconnection (unbound). 
«This qualification allows us to understand that is not 
only the relationship with the object that is attacked, 
but all of its substitutes - the self, for example, and the 
investment itself, to the extent that it suffered an objec-
talizing process (Green, 1988b, p. 65).
Green (1988b) makes an association between 
the deobjectifying function and what he calls negative 
narcissism (directly related to what we saw as the Neu-
tral category ie, an aspiration to reach zero excitation). 
In such cases, what overlap is a sense of psychic dea-
th (negative hallucination of the Ego) and sometimes 
a threat of loss of inner and outer reality, which has a 
direct impact on mental functioning. This last becomes 
depleted and unable to make connections (symboliza-
tions). With the damaged psychic functioning, we can 
see that Eros or love loses its strength to aggressive and 
violent forces that are present in the relationship with 
the primary object and in the autoeroticism.
For the author, the deobjectifying function can-
not be confused with mourning. The first is a procedu-
re more radical, since opposed to the grief work «that 
is at the center of the transformation processes charac-
teristic of the objectifying function». Therefore, grief 
and masochism are still expressions of Eros. The neu-
tral expression of the deobjectifying function is labor of 
the destruction drive.
Masochism and the neutral: the work of 
Eros and of destruction drive
The study of masochism in Freud (1924) gains 
importance on the understanding of borderline cases 
because of the description from the pathological form 
of moral masochism it provides. In this specific mode 
of illness, the subject is caught up by a repetitive need for 
punishment and prevented to succeed in his own life. We 
can think in what Figueiredo (2003) calls «sabotage of 
pleasure» or «deauthorizing of the perceptual process».
Freud (1924) states that the danger of masochism 
derives from a double origin: a «source lies in the death 
drive, that portion of it which escaped from being direc-
ted outwards in the form of destruction drive, but on the 
other hand, (... ) It also represents [Bedeutung] an erotic 
component» (Freud, 1924, p. 115). He shows that even 
in cases of self-destruction a specific mode of libidinal 
satisfaction is present.
Green (1993/2010) claims that Freud opened the 
concept of masochism in «form of the triptych», which 
means «its origin in the sexuality (in its relationship to 
pain, but with the possibility of inversion that ensures the 
supremacy of pain as a condition of enjoyment), reversal 
of phallic sexual value, ‘subversion of the moral order» 
(Green, 1993/2010, p. 107). Masochism as a form of 
perversion can maintain the subject in an unfortunate 
state, because the more he is injured, the more he can 
be strengthened, to the point of becoming invulnerable.
In the text quoted above, called The economic pro-
blem of masochism (1924), Freud introduces a new idea on 
masochism. He had already written about masochism in 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Drives and its 
vicissitudes (1915) and A Child Is Being Beaten (1919). The 
difference is that, if masochism was first understood as 
a derivative of previous sadism, now it stands as the idea 
that there is a primary or erotogenic masochism.
With the understanding of the phenomenon 
of masochism in the metapsychology sphere, Freud 
(1924) states that «when the pain and displeasure no 
longer have the usual function of alarms and (...) beco-
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me desired goals, the pleasure principle [Lustprinzip] is 
totally out of combat ie, the guardian of our psychic life is 
paralyzed» (Freud, 1924, p. 105, emphasis added). And 
it’s about the idea of totally that Freud manages to do a 
reassessment on the pleasure derived from or associa-
ted with pain, a violence that the subject repeatedly im-
putes against himself, but whose psychic organization 
(«cause») is unconscious to him.
He says that the excitations derived from the 
pain and the displeasure must also be added to the ex-
citement of the sexual drives. This is a physiological 
excitatory infantile mechanism, archaic. It is on this 
physiological basis that sadism would be formed and 
differentiates from original and erogenous masochism. 
Being the death drive more originary, it would be up to 
the libido the role of expelling the destructive drive of 
the organism, preventing the subject from entering in a 
state of «inorganic stability» (death).
Separated, Eros and destruction drives remain 
archaic characteristics of a time in which they were 
merged. Separated, sadism and original masochism find 
different paths. The sadism is projected out and may 
return to its former condition as a secondary maso-
chism, and original masochism would remain inside the 
organism. It would be the portion of death drive that 
remained in the body, amalgamated to the sexual exci-
tement that binds pain and pleasure.
The moral masochism, derived from feminine 
masochism, and therefore from a need to be punished 
because of an unlawful act committed, is characterized 
by the destruction drive force acting violently against the 
«own Self [Selbst]» (Freud, 1924, p.111). Driven by a 
need for punishment, the suffering itself is what mat-
ters. The moral masochism has its importance because 
it is directly related to what we took, from the ideas of 
Green (1986), as the archaic assumption: its relations-
hip to the superego, which holds the function of moral 
conscience.
According to Freud (1924), the Ego sees in the 
Superego a model to follow because it is representative 
of both the Id and the outside world. The superego 
brings the story of moral values  internalized by the sub-
ject in his early childhood from parental figures. The 
introjected prohibitions return by a desire for punish-
ment and suffering. Both would function like a limit to 
everything that is still present in the subject and over-
take the dictates of morality.
It is possible here to think of all the maneuvers 
performed by borderline cases to boycott their own ca-
pacity for achievement, including attacking their own 
desire and sense of reality. But Green (1988b) makes 
a difference between the Freudian moral masochistic 
and the moral narcissistic of nowadays. If the maso-
chist lives haunted by guilt, the narcissist lives steeped 
in shame. If the guilt speaks on a subject persecuted for 
wanting what he cannot, even unconsciously, shame is a 
way in which the subject deals with his own limits, with 
his own excess or his own lack.
From the moral narcissism, it is possible to think 
about the category proposed by Green (1988b) and ca-
lled Neutral. In moral masochism, the target of desire 
is pain and suffering. In moral narcissism, the search is 
for not wanting as a way to get rid of the evil powers 
of Destiny and the punishment of the superego. The 
neutral would aim for the a-sexuality, understood as a 
defensive position against a psychic bisexuality, suppor-
tive of gender difference.
In this sense, can we also think that, beyond the 
pleasure principle, what rules the psychic activity is 
the principle of Neutral instead? And that the Neutral 
is constituted of a non-sexuality? «The Neutral is the 
area of impartiality in the intellect invoked by Freud 
when he postulated the existence of the death drive» 
(Green, 1988b, p.21), the metaphor of returning to an 
inanimate state. «The Ego petrification aims the anes-
thesia and the inertia found in psychic death» (Green, 
1988b, p.24). The inertia in psychic death is a relief 
from all desire, against every source of decentering 
and anguish. Undoubtedly, it is also about the death 
of him-self.
The neutral is related to the concept of negative 
narcissism: «it is the dark double of the unitary Eros 
from positive narcissism» (Green, 1988a, p. 41) which 
seeks a regressive return to the zero point. For the au-
thor, the negative narcissism is different from maso-
chism. The difference is that masochism is a painful 
condition that aims the pain and its maintenance as the 
only possible form of existence. «Inversely, the nega-
tive narcissism addresses the absence, the anesthesia, 
the blank, whether this blank invests affection (indiffe-
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rence), representation (the negative hallucination) or 
thought (white psychosis)» (Green, 1988a, p. 41).
It is about an ascesis in an attempt to create a spa-
ce for self-sufficiency and the extinction of any excite-
ment, any desire, and therefore any decentering, anguish 
and trauma. «Caught between the double and the half, 
only the Zero seems safe. But so that the Zero can be, it 
is necessary to name it, to write it, and then the inelimi-
nable One reappears, below it» (Green, 1988a, p.237). 
Just as the desire of completion is never fully satisfied, 
the aim of not desiring is not successful either.
One comment of the Brazilian publisher preceding 
a Freud´s text called The Ego and the Id (1923) presents 
the idea of a neutral gender in Psychoanalysis and allows 
us to think that, with the existence of the neutral cate-
gory, the subject will have to deal with issues beyond his 
own desire, or with issues unfamiliar to him, that cross 
him through. The editor says, about the neutral gender in 
psychoanalysis, that «the das Es is characterized as an entity, 
a psychic authority, which is both a repository as it is a psychic 
source from which manifest all Triebe, Drange and we Zwänge 
that plague us» (Hanns, 2007, p.20, emphasis added).
Note that the neutral gender Es brings up the ques-
tion of the constitution of the Ego. It speaks of a psychic 
instance that is the subject itself and at the same time, it 
is contained in it. That flows from him and crosses him, 
but simultaneously it is strange to him. It evokes the dri-
ve impulses that bring the issues at times of repetition, at 
times of destruction, but also issues of the synthesis and 
the satisfaction of necessities. We can think that, besides 
the drive-object relationship (sexuality), we may also find 
the relationship between the neutral and the object (a-
sexuality), understood as non-sexuality.
Retaking the idea of  Green mentioned above, the 
Neutral, and not the displeasure, replaced the pleasure. 
Therefore, how can we think about the relationship bet-
ween the Ego and the object? How can we think about 
borderline cases, the ones that present a narcissistic fra-
gility as a symptom?
In the context of the first topic (conscious, pre-
conscious, unconscious), whose model is based on the 
interpretation of dreams there is not the object exactly, 
because there is no external world. The world is inter-
nal, closed on itself, and it is a world of representations ( 
thing representation and word representation) and char-
ges, investments and divestments. It is a world where re-
presentations are invested or divested by the libido.
The «quasi-object» is the object of drive and it 
searches for pulsional satisfaction, its own depletion. 
It responds to a model called hallucinatory realization 
of desire. This model assumes a «prevalent enrollment, 
sufficiently attested by traces of an experience of satisfac-
tion that serves a reference, ‘if necessary’, through the 
use of representation (hallucinatory realization) of such 
experience of satisfaction as a goal to achieve to recover 
calmness» (Green, 1993/2010, p.196). It opposes con-
servation and sexuality, as it answers the hunger (self-
preservation) and sexuality too (pleasure of sucking).
Under the second topic (Id, Ego, superego), 
Freud expands the notion of the psychic apparatus and 
includes the external world, the world of objects. Freud 
considers that the libido must seek actual objects that 
can satisfy it by making paths to the drive. The Ego, as 
the first internal object, is constituted in the experience it-
self, in relation to the external object. The Ego is born 
and tries to control the pulsional movement From this 
we can deduce that the birth of the Ego, its narcissistic 
defenses, «represent, among other things, the forced at-
tempt of the ego to ‘internalize’, circumscribe the area of 
its traumatic history» (Cardoso, 2010, p 55), which was 
to sustain the experience of alterity. In borderline cases, 
the support of this experience is experienced «through 
violent ‘anxiety’, agonizing over the threat of abandon-
ment that comes paradoxically combine with despair at 
risk of being invaded, engulfed by the other» (Cardoso, 
2010, p. 55).
We are entitled to think that the subject finds him-
self trapped in his own traumatic experience of self constitution, 
a persistent action to stay alive. We may think that this is 
a defense mechanism against the idea of  an Ego that, in 
order to be strengthened and desiring should also be pu-
nished. He survives in the negative, in an a-sexuality, not 
to be negativated. But we also think that it is not about 
defense purely, but it is also an attempt of subscription of 
what has been experienced and that cannot be remem-
bered as a screen memory (Freud, 1899), reappearing 
as trauma.
The screen memory has peculiarities that make 
it distinct of a memory. The first peculiarity is that it 
is provided with resistance. It means that what remains 
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as a memory image does not match the relevant expe-
rience in the subject’s life. The strengths of memory and 
resistance to the memory, in such opposition, create a 
resistance to one another and form a third conciliator 
of the existence of both. There are records of an image 
that does not correspond to the elements of experience. 
This image is displaced and seemingly trivial. Experience 
keeps its force of expression displaced from its essential 
elements (Carvalho & Viana, 2009).
Another peculiarity is that the subject appears as 
an object among other objects of memory, denoting that 
he is also an observer of the scene. If he is observant, one 
can deduce that it is a constructed scene, whose law is 
to express an unconscious content on an infantile image 
which, because of its innocence, its obviousness, can ma-
nifest. Freud says: «It’s like if a childhood mnemonic trace 
is translated in a plastic and visual form at a later time - 
the time of awakening of the scene. However, the original 
impression is not reproduced and has never penetrated 
the consciousness of the subject» (Freud, 1899, p. 303).
The subject is an observer of the scene, but he 
is also captured by it. He has forgotten how he consti-
tuted this scene. He has forgotten that we all are scene 
observers, prisoners of modernity, rendered into objects 
even to ourselves. He remains, then, slave of an infan-
tile fantasy, the slave of a past time that does not pass. 
This is exactly what Freud points out in Creative writers and 
day-dreaming (Freud, 1908 [1907]), as something that 
the adult is ashamed of. It is no longer a children’s play 
and it has become a childish fantasy that imprisoned him 
(Carvalho & Viana, 2009).
The memory of trauma cannot be mediated by re-
membrance, as it is not registered in a chain of represen-
tation and symbolization. According to Maldonado and 
Cardoso (2009), what is destroyed on borderline sub-
jects is not the content of experience, but the links that 
allow the construction of a story from that experience. 
This results on fragmentation of the integrity of the Ego. 
In this case, «the memories are not screen memories re-
lated to repression, but memories concerning the cleava-
ge as a mechanism that promotes fragmentation and divi-
sion of the Ego into incommunicable parts» (Maldonado 
& Cardoso, 2009).
For all the above, we can say that the trauma is 
condition of constitution of the subject: It can be either 
through an excess of external stimuli –and also inter-
nal, drive stimuli– that cannot be part of the chain of 
psychic representation (Freud, 1920); or by means of 
«subversion of the time that sexuality introduces in the 
subjectification process» (Celes, 1999, p. 02). In both 
cases, «the traumatic presents itself as a requirement of 
presentification» (Maldonado & Cardoso, 2009, p. 53). 
Either to make a past pass or to (re)construct a past ca-
pable of future.
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